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 Abstract  
This paper examines the growth of global non-state and multilateral actors in the ‘global 
south’ and the creation of frontier markets in the higher education sector. These 
developments are part of market-making changes in higher education as the sector is 
opened to new actors, logics, and innovative services, aimed at ‘the global south’. Yet 
making a higher education market that brings in new investors, providers and consumers 
from within and across the global north and south is a complex process that requires 
imagining and materialising through new social devices, norms and institutions so that 
the higher education sector works like a capitalist market based on competition, credit, 
commodification and creativity (Beckert, 2013).  The paper examines these processes 
through three entry points; recruiters of international students; for-profit providers of 
HE; and financial agents providing new forms of credit.  We argue these developments 
both play off, and reinforce, older and newer asymmetries of power between individuals, 
social groups and nations, within and between the global north and south, creating an 
even greater learning divide.   
Keywords: higher education, marketization, recruitment agents, investors, credit, for-
profit providers, global south, global north 
 
  
 Introduction 
This paper examines the growth of global non-state and multilateral actors in the higher 
education sector and the creation of frontier markets in the global south (Marber, 2014). 
These developments are part of ‘market-making’ changes in higher education as the 
sector is opened to new actors, logics and innovative education services aimed at ‘the 
global south’ (Connell, 2007a, 2007b; Santos, 2014).  
Yet making a higher education market that also brings in new investors, providers and 
consumers from within and across the global north and south is a complex process (see 
Komljenovic & Robertson, 2015; Robertson & Komljenovic, 2016). As Beckert (2013) 
shows, it requires imagining and materialising through the creation and deployment of 
new social devices, norms and institutions, so that the higher education sector 
increasingly works like a capitalist market based upon competition, credit, 
commodification and creativity.  
We begin by elaborating our use of the concepts, ‘global north’ and ‘global south’. We then 
bring these concepts into conversation with wider political, economic and technological 
conditions for the ongoing expansion of capitalist market-making processes in 
geographically-located higher education sectors. We then introduce three case studies to 
explore these processes, and the corresponding non-state actors who work in, on, and 
through, the global north and south: (i) lubricating the wheels of student mobility via 
‘recruiters’ and ‘brokers’; (ii) lubricating the wheels of new ‘providers’ in the sector who 
put into place very different higher education practices targeted at a different student 
demographic, and (iii) lubricating the wheels of student access via new modalities of 
credit, involving new relationships between education investors and debtors.  
We conclude by arguing that there are also considerable frictions confronting these 
projects, as not only must market-making contend with existing imaginaries and 
practices regarding the public good nature of higher education and how it should be 
invested in, but when rogue traders, failed markets, increased indebtedness, and wealth 
inequalities, are made visible, these act as a contrast to, and also shed light upon, these 
very different projects and their social relations for the north and the south.  
 
The ‘Global South’ – A Social, Spatial and Relational Concept 
The idea of the global south has several distinct, though related, meanings and it is 
important to distinguish them so as to avoid flattening class and other relations in any 
one territorial space.  
The more commonly shared meaning of the ‘global south’ refers to a large number of 
territorially-located countries in Africa, Central and South America, and Asia, who face 
major economic and other development challenges. Reference to the global south here is 
nevertheless a relational concept, in that the level of development that is being referred 
is contrasted with other parts of the world – Europe and North America in particular – 
who in turn constitute the ‘global north’. Around 160 of a total of 195 independently 
recognized states are broadly included in the global south; the other 35 countries make 
up the global north – often also referred to as the OECD, or rich countries, club1 
(Woodward, 2009).  
A second meaning of the concept, global south, is also social and relational – but in this 
case we use it to refer to those communities/populations whose circumstances 
(economic, cultural, political, technological), when compared to the rest of the population 
in that territory, are highly precarious and marginal. In this case, the global south can also 
mean individuals and communities in developed countries.  Examples include groups 
living on or under the poverty line2,  asylum seekers who have limited access to social 
welfare, or ethnic and other groups who find themselves marginalised from the 
mainstream in what are otherwise wealthy countries.3  Alternatively we might see a 
global north in the geographic global south; for example, the gated communities and 
exclusive education aimed at local and international political and economic elites in 
countries such as Nigeria, South Africa or Brazil.   
In this paper we will show that it is not only the emerging middle class and elites in the 
geographic global south who are the targets of the new for-profit providers and recruiters 
and recruiting universities from the north, or universities located in those cities and 
countries – for example the University of Johannesburg in South Africa, who exercise a 
degree of hegemony across the region. The horizon has expanded to include poorer and 
marginalised populations in the geographic north with the offer of specially developed 
on-line programmes, and credit via new financial products to fund their studies. Similarly, 
new for-profit providers in the United States have focused a great deal of attention in 
their marketing strategies on aspirational minority groups in the US who have 
historically not participated in higher education (Deming, Goldin, & Katz, 2011).   
 
Higher Education and the Global South 
It follows from our argument so far we are not only examining the role of non-state actors 
in exploiting frontier markets in low-income countries. Rather we are also focusing 
attention on those populations in the south and the north who have historically not 
accessed higher education, and who have become the object of attention by the higher 
education recruiters and brokers, investors, and for-profit providers.  In doing so we are 
not suggesting that the inclusion of otherwise excluded groups from higher education is 
a bad thing. Far from it. Rather, we are pointing to the tendency in frontier market-making 
                                                          
1 The total GDP of the OECD countries is US$49.3 trillion (see OECD, 2015, Gross domestic product (GDP) 
(indicator). doi: 10.1787/dc2f7aec-en – last accessed on 19 December 2015). The total GDP for the world 
is US$78.28 trillion [see https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html - 
last accessed 19th December, 2015]. This means that 160 countries share 37% and 34 countries share 
63% of the worlds GDP.   
2 For example, despite being one of the wealthiest countries in the world, the US Census Bureau in 2014 
reported that in the United States, 14.5% of all Americans lived below the poverty line; 33% of all 
household headed by a single mother live below the poverty line, whilst 42% of all households headed by 
a single black mother live below the poverty line (see 
http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar13.pdf - last accessed 19th December, 2015).  
3 "Today, OECD member countries account for 63 percent of world GDP, three-quarters of world trade, 95 
percent of world official development assistance, over half of the world’s energy consumption, and 18 
percent of the world’s population” [see http://usoecd.usmission.gov/mission/overview.html - last 
accessed 19th December, 2015].  
to exploit the aspirations of the marginalised populations by offering them often inferior 
higher education experiences at significantly higher costs and levels of indebtedness.   
The broad contours of the higher education sector in the global south, both historically 
and recently, has been shaped by the dominance of a hegemonic global north (aka ‘ the 
west, developed west, etcetera), with its civilizational project – modernity, and its 
privileging of western science as the engine of progress and principle form of reasoning 
(Araya & Marber, 2013; Santos, 2004). And though many countries in the south had their 
own institutions of higher learning for the political and cultural elite well before the 
creation of the medieval and modern European universities – from Pakistan to China, 
India, Egypt and Vietnam – these were eventually to be eclipsed by the globalising of a 
particular set of localisms from within the West around a particular set of ideas4 defining 
a university, with its distinctive forms of knowledge production, and relations to the 
wider world. In most cases, expanding empires and their colonial projects into Africa, 
Latin America, Oceania and Asia drove these movements and transformations. They also 
bought with them western disciplinary-based knowledges, and created new 
dependencies through alignments with universities in the global north. This included 
educating the university’s faculty in the north, funded as part of a university’s 
international mission, or by national and regional aid programmes (for example, the 
Colombo Plan, established in 1950 to provide development support to the Asia Pacific 
Region, including scholarships for further studies).  
However, many universities in the global south were highly dependent on state funding, 
and it was this relationship to the state would become problematic for institutional 
survival by the early 1990s (Robertson, 2009; Salmi, Hopper, & Malee Bassett, 2009; 
Samoff & Carrol, 2003). Many of the low-income countries in the global south found 
themselves in the vortex of structural adjustment programmes and the limits that were 
placed on state investment in higher education; a condition placed on them by the World 
Bank  and the conditionalities it imposed (Robertson et al., 2007).  
By the early 1990s, the twin effect of neoliberal structural adjustment policies, on the one 
hand, and little or limited state investment, on the other, generated a crisis in the sector 
with a preferred set of solutions regarding its resolution: embracing the private sector as 
a provider; leveraging new sources of funds through loans and other fiscal arrangements; 
cross border higher education trade; funded studies abroad and other initiatives; and 
capacity building partnerships with the global north (Lancrin, 2005). The wide embrace 
of ‘knowledge economy’ policies in many countries - with knowledge now regarded a 
crucial pillar of human development worldwide (World Bank, 2002: ix), the turn to trade 
in services – including in higher education - for the global north, the growing dominance 
of English as a global lingua franca, together with pressures to acquire symbolic capital 
in the form of an education in a ‘western’ institution to power social mobility,  all injected 
new momentum into the already existing uneven relationship between and within the 
global north and global south. Yet we do not want to suggest that this newer way of 
thinking about the economy and society, the legitimacy of a neoliberal market society, 
and the role of higher education in it, could be or was manufactured overnight. Rather 
                                                          
4 Newman’s ‘The Idea of a University’ in 1873, along with the von Humboldt’s view that knowledge should be created by 
research were to have a profound effect on the nature and shape of the modern university, and this version has been the one 
that has been globalised.    
these projects have demanded considerable work – ideologically, materially and 
institutionally – in the face of competing and existing projects – as we show below.   
 
From Old to New HE Imaginaries 
Social imaginaries organise collective understanding and meaning-making; social 
imaginaries  also descriptively normalise things as they are and normatively frame them 
as they should be (Taylor, 2002). Imaginaries cater for emergence, existence and the 
legitimation of multiple ideologies and they also condition common sense. Once 
sedimented into the DNA of any society through its institutions and cultural frames, they 
make it difficult to imagine possibilities beyond them as they curtail questions that are 
asked at a societal level and the possible answers that are considered viable (Stein & de 
Andreotti, 2015).  
Beckert (2013) argues that shaping imaginaries, and thus the decisions of individual 
actors, is a particularly important task in capitalist dynamics, as capitalism as an 
economic system depends upon being able to anticipate that the future will be like the 
present, though by definition the future is the future and can only be anticipated, and not 
known. Beckert (1996, 2013) draws attention to the ways in which political regulators 
and their speech acts in the field of the economy aim to shape the decisions, expectations 
and actions of actors, and the social and political structures underlying and reproducing 
those expectations. This demands a great deal of ideological and institutional work, and 
particularly so in seeking to bring a sector like higher education into the economic field 
as a commodity. He identifies four Cs of capitalism – commodification, credit, creativity 
and competition, which lubricate the wheels of capitalism and which need to orient 
expectations to ensure ongoing accumulation (Beckert, 2013). 
Imaginings work at multiple levels – from the macro- to the meso- and micro-levels  
(Komljenovic & Robertson, 2015). The idea of a knowledge-based economy (Jessop, 
Fairclough, & Wodak, 2008; Jessop & Sum, 2014) emerged as a distinct imaginary 
advanced at the macro-structural level by the OECD and those member countries (the 
USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada) who have sought to position themselves as 
services economies in contrast to their former status as primarily producers of goods. 
Since the late 1980s, higher education has also been constructed as part of a globally-
competitive services sector represented in global trade figures (Hughes, Porter, Jones, & 
Sheen, 2013). This has meant viewing higher education, not as a public good or public 
service, but as a commodity that can be bought and sold in the marketplace, with 
sophisticated market intelligence, marketing strategies and systems of credit to oil the 
wheels of its ongoing expansion. Locking in higher education as an economic good to be 
managed by the market, and not challenged by politics, is the objective of ongoing global 
and regional trade negotiations (Robertson & Komljenovic, 2015).   
A raft of technologies have also been creatively developed and promoted over the past 30 
years aimed at promoting competition, commodification and credit through 
institutionalising this political project, through social devices and norms that shape, and 
ensure, its ongoing social reproduction. This includes technologies like university 
rankings (Hazelkorn, 2009); global competitiveness indexes dependent on proxies like 
publications in international (English language/US scientific) journals that align 
knowledge production with global competition (Schwab & Sala-i-Martín, 2014); 
benchmarks and indicators such as the OECD’s Education at a Glance (OECD, 2015); and 
the EU’s indicators (DG EAC, 2014) which normalize ideas like competition, efficiency, 
consumerism, individualism, privatisation, innovation,  talent, knowledge,  student loans 
and debt. Such competition is either for a bigger possible share of international students, 
a higher place in university rankings, higher student enrolment rates, a higher share of 
public and private investment in education, and so on.  
The knowledge economy imaginary also normalizes competition in regional, national and 
institutional infrastructures, in turn shaping actor’s expectations about theirs and others 
futures. This can be evidenced in institutional, national, and supranational, policies, 
programmes and practices, where the direction of travel is ‘a race to the top’ as a globally-
competitive knowledge economy (Australian Government, 2015; HM Government, 
2013b). Higher education is reframed as an object of national or regional competitiveness 
governance, where competitiveness and commodification favours market forces over 
other criteria of judgement (Jessop & Sum, 2014; Sum & Jessop, 2013).  
Market making also requires those who are the object of such discourses to ‘buy into’, and 
thus ‘buy’, these ways of looking at the world. Here Howarth (2009) draws attention to 
psycho-social processes, like fantasy. Similarly Beckert (2013) points to the ways in 
which desiring and  imagining a better life become the rationale for indebtedness, with 
the expectation (fictional as one cannot know what the future will actually hold) this will 
be a good investment for the future. Concepts like fantasy and desire enable us to explore 
how personal/individual, institutional, national and regional wishes and desires are 
mobilized through marketing and recruitment campaigns which speak to aspirations to 
‘do well’, to ‘be western’, to acquire the status of ‘a good English speaker’, and so on, which 
in turn reproduce and strengthen not only ‘global north’ and ‘global south’ relations now 
shaped through market imaginaries and relations.  
 
Lubricating the Wheels of Market Making in the Global South 
So far we have argued the global south is a target for many new non-state actors to 
expand markets. In this section we explore key processes at work through three new 
kinds of actors in the HE sector; (i) recruiters/brokers for international student 
recruitment; (ii) new for-profit providers; and (iii) new forms of credit available from 
new kinds of investors.  And whilst they do not exhaust the new actors and processes in 
the sector, they reveal a great deal about how the global south is ‘spoken to’ and enrolled 
in capitalist market relations. The data for this section comes from selected policies, 
interviews conducted over 2014, and from secondary data and analyses. 
 
Lubricating the Wheels 1: Creating a Pipeline - Recruiters/Brokers  
In this first case we focus particularly on the rise of international student mobility and 
the role of recruiters as specialised agencies who now interact with universities and other 
HE providers. An international student recruitment agent is; “…an individual, company, 
or organization that provides educational advice, support, and placement to students in 
a local market who are interested in studying abroad” (De Luca, 2008, p. 36). In the past, 
agents mainly sent people abroad to undertake language training courses. What we 
report here is a relatively new phenomenon in the higher education sector (since late 
1980s starting in Australia and the UK). Agents began to sense students were looking for 
opportunities to study at a university in a foreign county as a result of factors such as 
limited home capacity, the desire for social mobility, and learning English as competitive 
advantage in the labour market. Much of the industry literature frames this in terms of 
the growth of a middle class in these countries, with aspirations for education and the 
resources to spend (OECD, 2014). This dynamic has created opportunities for recruiting 
agents to expand their business to include HE studies more generally.    
Despite this emerging phenomenon, few studies focus attention on the role of 
recruitment agents. As a result, we know little about how many of the four and a half 
million internationally mobile students (OECD, 2015) use agents, and whether or not 
agents are influential in student’s their decision-making. This matters in that many 
institutions spend increasing amounts of money on international student recruiters.   
The British Council, in a report in 2011) found that “…48% of interviewed East Asian 
students had contacts with an agent, compared to 41% in Africa, 39% in South Asia, 30% 
in Latin America, and 23% in Europe” (ACA, 2011). Pimpa (2003) report that recruitment 
agents and peers are the most influential factors for Thai students in Australia, and that 
agents exercise a stronger influence than peers. The Observatory on Borderless Higher 
Education (2014) found that 56 per cent of international students in Malaysia are 
recruited by agents,  56 per cent of international students in Australia, 47 per cent in New 
Zealand, 41 per cent in Canada, 38 per cent in the UK, 20 per cent in Netherlands, and 11 
per cent in the USA. Agents have thus become increasingly more important and powerful 
players in international student mobility flows over time (Thomson, Hulme, Hulme, & 
Doughty, 2014).  
Recruiters have also expanded their orbit of interests and influence – from one largely 
based on the colonial relations of language to now a newer, though no less, colonial and 
imperialistic economic project. Nevertheless, the practice of using agents is controversial 
in most ‘receiving’ countries (see Raimo 2014; Chopra 2015), in that what is implied is 
that commercial interests and ‘hard sell’ trump academic standards at universities and 
enable immigration scams. This is indicative of the struggles and frictions present when 
a market is being constructed in a sector where previously the language of 
price/consumerism/competitive markets has been an alien idea.  
A given market becomes stable when the product gains legitimacy with customers 
(Fligstein, 2001). In the case of transforming public sectors into capitalist market 
relations, this means securing legitimacy within the public realm. Cultural acceptance of 
using recruitment agents depends on ‘instituting’ this market in specific locations,  to use 
Polanyi’s (1944) terminology. Where there is growing thickening or ‘institutedness’ of 
higher education institutions – in particular the UK, USA, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand – we can see recruiting agents also being more freely used.  
In the UK, agents are an explicit part of government strategies (HM Government, 2013a, 
2013b). The British Council, a public agency who has historically promoted and provided 
English-language courses, now manages an agents’ database, provides training for 
agents, and issues ‘good practice’ guidance for agents and universities (British Council, 
2015; Raimo, Humfrey, & Huang, 2014). Thomson et al (2014) report that in the last 
decade,  the British Council has reduced its direct presence in African markets and instead 
expanded its partnership with agents who have a presence in, and thus also operate, 
locally.  
Large exporters of education services (measured in terms of international student 
mobility), like Australia and New Zealand, have national approval systems for agents 
(ICEF Monitor 2015). Agents are also part of national strategies for increasing numbers 
of international students (Australian Government 2015). Education New Zealand, ENZ – 
a governmental structure provides training for agents, manages a database of trained and 
reliable agents, manages all promotional material and resources for these agents, and 
provides general support for the higher education institutions and agents they are 
working with (Education New Zealand 2015; Custer 2014).  
In 2012, education officials from the UK, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand adopted a 
Code of Ethics for international recruitment agents in what is now known as the ‘London 
Statement’ (British Council and Australian Government: Australian Education 
International, 2012; British Council, 2012). Each country was to implement the principles 
by 2013. This statement was prepared in a forum called a “Roundtable Discussion on the 
Integrity in International Education - a Forum at which Australia, the UK, Canada, Ireland, 
New Zealand and the US meet to share knowledge and experience and identify common 
areas of practice and concern, as well as scope for collaboration” (Australian Embassy 
Thailand, 2012). These global north countries share a common language, history and 
culture. They are also deeply engaged in advancing neoliberalism as a political project, 
and a market society as an outcome. It is therefore not odd they are cooperating in an 
attempt to keep their country at the top regarding competition for a share of the global 
student market, a place in the global rankings (of which one measure is the international 
nature of the student population), a share of talent, and a healthy economic return in GDP 
terms.  
The practice of using recruitment agents within and between the global south and north 
in turn restructures their social and power relations in the higher education sector. It 
means those universities who use agents have effectively out-sourced a large proportion 
of their institutional representation in fairs and other venues of the student application 
and selection processes, application support, and ongoing consultation services. 
Universities instead pay fees to agents, usually ranging between 10 and 17.5 per cent of 
first year’s tuition fee (ICEF Monitor, 2014). In the UK, a Times Higher investigation found 
that among 158 higher education institutions in the UK, the average agent fee was  £1,767, 
though this was dependent on the region, market and institution (Havergal, 2015). This 
means universities effectively ‘buy’ students through agent’s services. The question we 
ask here is:  How, and in what ways do these practices transform the relationship 
between the university and a student? When this relationship is mediated through a 
consumer exchange relation, does it change perceptions of the use value of education? 
And, how does the student view themselves in relation to their learning, to academics, 
and their enrolling institution?   
Our research reveals that the practice of using recruitment agents has allowed for 
innovation and experimentation in the education sector, including possibilities for new 
and diverse range of products and services that can be bought and sold, enabling new 
suppliers to come into the sector. And it is here when recruiters now act  as ‘edu-brokers’ 
by setting up market encounters between sets of actors and charging a fee for this service. 
As edu-brokers they forge new economic encounters, and thus change the nature of the 
social relations between education institutions and recruitment agents (these are private 
companies, the leading being: Alphe from the UK, BMI from Brazil, FPP EduMedia from 
Brazil, ICEF from Germany and Weba from Switzerland). These encounters are organised 
in the form of workshops with much of the agenda aimed at ‘speed dating’ types of 
meetings. Education institutions pay fees to attend these events (between £1,050 and 
£3,700 depending on the company, type of workshop, and location) whilst agents do not. 
In this respect institutions are paying for the ‘promise’ they will be able to meet reliable 
recruitment agents (Mazzarol, 1998).   
As Beckert (2013: 332) reminds us, ‘trustworthiness’ is critically important in making 
markets so as to generate confidence regarding the promise of a return into the future. 
For this fee, institutions receive access to material to prepare themselves for the 
workshop, such as access to the meeting schedule, agents and their details, a table at the 
workshop where agents move every half an hour, and participation in receptions and 
parties. These workshops aim to reduce risks and accelerate trust in agents by higher 
education institutions. They are also predictable and safe spaces.  Recruiting companies 
differ amongst themselves as to types of workshops offered, locations of workshops, and 
degrees of rigor regarding quality check of agents.  
Some companies have recently begun to transfer the practice of workshops from 
institution-to-agent to flow back in the other direction; from institution-to-institution. In 
doing so, they have created a new service at a price, producing an increasingly more 
mature and dynamic market. The locations of workshops follow markets trends in 
student flows and recruitment agents. These workshops are organised so that either 
western institutions can travel to countries of student origin in the global south, or where 
agents from the global south can travel to the most popular study destination countries 
(typically the north).  
In this sense the brokers’ market does not need to be materialised-locally, or territorially 
embedded (Hess, 2004). But it does need to be fixed, or stabilised, in places in order for 
it to be reproduced in what Jessop (2006) describes as a ‘spatio-temporal fix’. These 
workshops are efforts at fixing social relations at the same time as being flexible and fluid. 
In this way, brokers create multiple points of fixity, whilst also being responsive by 
moving to new places, depending upon imagined future markets. In doing so, brokers 
reinforce the asymmetries between the global north and the global south, whilst 
providing opportunities for ‘new players’ on each side to enter.  
 
Lubricating the Wheels 2:  New logics, markets and products – ‘For-Profit Providers’  
In this second ‘lubricating’ of higher education market-making, we focus on the expansion 
of for-profit providers. Global and national education corporations include Laureate 
Education, Kaplan, Bridgewater, INTO, Apollo Group, DeVry University, and Kroton 
amongst others. We are particularly interested in the conditions that have enabled their 
presence as competitors, how they position themselves in the sector and in relation to 
what kind of student base, the ways the ‘for-profit’ logic is managed to secure trust, and 
how they legitimate their presence to ensure, and stabilise, their longer-term futures as 
sellers of higher education services. We also explore how and in what ways for-profit 
actors ameliorate or exacerbate, global north-south relations and their attendant social 
inequalities given that in many cases they legitimate their presence by arguing they bring 
higher education to a neglected population.  
We find Deming et al’s (2011: 3-4) definition of the for-profit provider helpful:  
The for-profit postsecondary school sector, at its simplest level, is a group of 
institutions that give post-high school degrees or credentials and for which 
some of the legal ‘non-distributional requirements’ that potentially constrain 
non-profit schools do not bind. For example, for profit institutions can enter 
the equity markets and there are few constraints on the amounts that they can 
pay their top managers”.  
Private and public universities who are not-for-profit might make a surplus, but as their 
legal status is as a charitable body, any excess must be reinvested in the development of 
the institution rather than valorised as profits. However, many of the owners and 
managers of for-profit universities based in the US and beyond take out high levels of CEO 
compensation, with some CEOs earning the super-salaries (Chronicle of Higher 
Education, 2010) which Piketty (2014) identifies as part of the 1% of the top 10 %. Not 
only do the owners and managers of the global education corporations take out a highly 
lucrative salary, but in public liability companies the manager works for the shareholders 
and not the students or academics teaching in the institution.  
For-profit private institutions have (until recently) been the fastest growing part of the 
US higher education sector – increasing from 0.2% in the 1970s to 9.1% of total 
enrolment in degree awarding higher education institutions in 2009 (Deming et al., 
2011). Their rise in the USA, as in countries like Brazil and the UK, has been enabled by: 
growing pressure on adult learners to acquire credentials; the rising cost of tuition, on-
line provision as a result of technological developments; and more porous boundaries 
around nation-state enabling global expansion.   
For-profits are highly diverse in their range of programmes and sizes (Hentschke, 
Lechuga, & Tierney, 2010; Morey, 2004). They also have the highest fraction of non-
traditional students obtaining the greatest proportion of their total revenue from federal 
student aid (loans and grants) programme. In 2009 they enrolled 1.85 million US 
students – many in shorter certificate rather than degree programmes (Deming et al., 
2011).  
For-profit firms are not just active in the USA, though they are particularly prominent 
there. Recently there has been a major growth in activity in Brazil as part of the overall 
expansion of HE enrolments (though it is still less than 20% of the 18-24 aged cohort – 
with government plans to increase the level of participation to 33%).  Ten of the largest 
for-profits now educate about two million post-secondary students and account for over 
1/3 of Brazil’s students. Recently the largest Brazilian for-profit provider bought 
Anhanduera, the second largest, with a stock market value of more than $8 billion and a 
clientele of one million (Tierney & Iloh, 2014).  
Many of the for-profits also tend to serve a particular student population; one that we 
earlier identified as the ‘global south’ in the ‘global north’. If we look at US-based data, we 
can see that the for-profits serve older students, women, African Americans, Hispanics 
and those who are single parents, with much lower family incomes (Deming et al., 2011: 
7),  and likely to be living under the poverty line. Many of these students are entitled to 
receive federal financial aid in the form of loans and grants (and in some cases – large 
national chains like Kaplan University and the University of Phoenix receive more than 
80% of their revenues from federal sources) which they must pay back immediately 
when studies are completed. It needs to be pointed out, however, that at least in the USA, 
for-profit courses are more expensive than many state universities, and where students 
also need to take out additional loans in the form of credit to pay for the cost of tuition 
(see below). In the UK, on the other hand, for-profit universities, such as Pearson College, 
charge close to 50% less than the average student annual undergraduate fee of £9,000 
(Hughes et al., 2013: 65). 
In Brazil – the global north (meaning the local social elites) attend the best universities 
which are both public and free, whilst poorer students have historically attended not-for-
profit private higher education providers (Gomes, Robertson, & Dale, 2013; Horch, 2014). 
The existence of this older private sector servicing the poor has made it easier for the for-
profits to enter and survive. That a ‘left-wing’ government also supports the expansion of 
for-profit higher education providers to meet its own political objectives, of expanding 
access to HE service a knowledge economy, in turn shapes acceptance.     
Across the countries that we looked at where for-profits are active, the business model 
for the sector is based on taking a successful programme and using new web technologies 
to offer standardised curriculum, often in an on-line environment, with a very small back-
office staff, to a very large number of students located across the chain, paying part-time 
instructors (Deming et al., 2011; Morey, 2004). Like all corporations, they benefit from 
economies of scale and scope, as well as the use of flexible employment practices. As a 
chain they have centralised sales and advertising – and deploy very large budgets to do 
so (around 24% of revenue). They have dedicated marketing people acting as recruiters 
with monthly targets (Robertson & Komljenovic, 2016).  
Many for-profit higher education providers are highly innovative in how they have 
established themselves in the sector, expanding their ‘customer’ base and accessing 
sources of credit (often state-backed loan books) to ensure viability and profitability.  One 
example is Laureate Education, whose footprint in the global south tops that of any 
American higher education institution; 80% of its revenues come from outside of the USA 
(Redden & Fain, 2012) and around 60% of its operations are in - developing countries 
such as Brazil, South Africa and Turkey.  In its operations in the USA, students are able to 
access federal loans to fund some of the cost of their studies.  In 2015 it enrolled 1 million 
students spread across 28 countries and 88 institutions around the globe (Fain, 2014a, 
2014b; Laureate Education, 2015) employing 70,000 employees, faculty and staff 
(Laureate, 2015). Students study in low-cost programmes, such as education, health 
sciences, business education, engineering and hospitality management.  
Tracing through the history of Laureate Education helps illustrate one model of 
expansion: the use of private equity investors; buying up highly indebted or ailing 
institutions; operating in those parts of the world where the regulatory environment is 
more conducive to their operations; a strong marketing department; most recently,  a 
tranche of investment funds from the World Bank’s private investment arm - the 
International Finance Corporation (Laureate Education, 2013); and legitimacy through 
courting the rich and the famous to appear at its conferences and be on its governing 
board. These elements combine to make a particular kind of competitive global higher 
education provider reshaping the HE sector as a result of enabling new buyers (students) 
of higher education services.  
Like most for-profits, Laureate invests a great deal in marketing; its budget is around 
$200 million, using telemarketers who have scripts and recruitment targets (Çalışkan & 
Callon, 2010), with those turning in good sales performances given bonuses (Kimes & 
Smith, 2014). This means cost savings elsewhere; in comparison to a more convention 
university – Laureate has most of its academic teaching staff on part-time contracts, and 
contracts which do not involve and value other cost-adding activity, such as research.   
One of the biggest issues facing for-profit providers most particularly in the USA is the 
lower level of performance of the students, and a high rate of loan defaults, causing the 
government to try and regulate the sector.  At the same time, critics point out that this is 
not a ‘normal’ population, and that their minority and disadvantaged profile has a 
significant bearing on student outcomes (Deming et al., 2011). Others point to the ‘hard 
sell’ tactics of the recruiters whose own pay is based on demanding performance targets. 
The angle on selling is to tap into the desires of marginalised populations - to be someone, 
and their aspirations for the future of their family. This commodification of aspirations is 
a form of exploitation. More importantly, in understanding capitalist markets and higher 
education, this kind of practice generates a lack of trust and the real possibility the 
investors will not get their money back into the future as the populations targeted will 
never earn the level of income that enables them to service the debt. This creates an 
unstable market with wary investors and buyers, as expectations about a future return 
do not materialise.   
 
Lubricating the Wheels 3:  Expanding HE as a commodity Financial Actors 
In this third case, we look at the rise of financial actors in the non-state sector.  Their role 
is particularly in ensuring the supply of credit so as to enable the creation of capitalist 
markets.  Credit is an indispensable element in enabling capitalism’s economic growth 
(Beckert, 2013: 330). This axiom led Joseph Schumpeter (1954) to observe that, at its 
most basic, capitalism was a system of indebtedness. “Capitalism is that form of private 
property economy in which innovations are carried out by means of borrowed money, 
which in general…implies credit creation” (Schumpeter, 1939: 223). Indeed the ‘capitalist 
engine’ cannot be understood “…without reference to its credit operations and a 
distinctive monetary system involving the creation of money by banks through the selling 
of debt” (Schumpeter, 1954: 318-20).  
Why is credit, or the selling of debt, so important? It is because the accumulation of capital 
and growth of the economy depends on a higher level of demand than that which the 
owners of capital can create through their own payments.  
Credit needs to be explained based on the (speculative) expectations of future 
profits (investment credit) and the desire for a higher living standard in the 
present (consumer credit). Through credit, an investor obtains purchasing 
power in the present against a promise – the promise to repay the loan at a 
specified point in time, together with an additional sum called interest 
(Beckert, 2013: 331).  
Profit-maximising actors, such as those we referred to in the previous two ‘lubricatings’ 
– the recruiters and brokers, and the new for-profit providers – all use credit to the extent 
that their investments generate higher profits than the cost of interest. From the point of 
view of the creditors, for example Banco Santander who sells students in higher 
education ‘loans’ to cover their fees and other costs, this provides them with a new 
market from which to gain additional wealth, and to avoid the depreciation of money over 
time through inflation.   
As Beckert (Beckert, 2013: 331) points out, what makes credit and money so interesting 
from a sociological point of view is that though there is an expectation that the debtor 
(e.g. the student, a university, other edu-business actors, the state) will live up to their 
promise to repay the loan, this cannot be rationally calculated because the future cannot 
be known or foreseen. Here creditors must act as if the can anticipate the future. And as 
we will see in the examples we will explore regarding new financial products in the 
sector, a range of ‘risk’ checks are built into the assessment of whether or not to lend 
money, at what rate of interest, with what kind of repayment scheme, over what time 
period, and so on.  
In many countries around the globe, higher education places have been either fully or 
partly subsidised by the state though this is changing as the sector itself becomes a mass 
rather than an elite system (OECD, 2014). And whilst the state might lend money to 
service its public debts, here we are interested in exploring efforts by interested actors 
and political institutions, such as Lumni, Upstart, and Parthenon-EY, and the World 
Bank’s private lending arm the International Finance Corporation, to put into place, and 
normalise, opportunities for investors to enter into the higher education sector offering 
new and innovative credit arrangements to students and institutions in the higher 
education sector.    
Since the early 2000s, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) has been promoting 
higher education as a frontier and emerging market, where it argues the private sector 
could, and should, play a larger role in (Mundy & Menashy, 2012). Over the period 2000-
2007 the IFC provided $237 million in financing to 37 private education projects in 20 
global south countries. Some of these loans were tagged to helping students from poorer 
household’s to access higher education places. But they were also used to encourage local 
entrepreneurs and transnational firms to develop private fee-paying education.  Here the 
availability of credit then enables students to pay private fees. In 2008, for example, the 
IFC set up a loans scheme in Jordan with the Omnix International and Cairo Amman Bank 
to enable 3,000 students to take out loans to cover the cost of their tuition (Robertson, 
2009: 127). We noted above that the IFC also made a significant investment in Laureate 
Education in 2014, as itself an investor and not just a political regulator in shaping 
expectations and actions regarding market-making practices.   
In 2015 the IFC published the report - Learning from Global Best Practice and Financial 
Innovations, with Parthenon-EY (IFC, 2015).  Parthenon-EY also produced a further 
report in 2015 – Driving Grades, Driving Growth: How Private Capital in Education is 
Increasing Access, Inspiring Innovation and Improving Outcomes.  EY here is Ernst and 
Young, one of the top four global consulting firms. Parthenon was created in 1991 as the 
Parthenon Group with a focus on the education sector.  In 2014, the Parthenon Group 
merged with Ernst and Young to form Parthenon-EY. This partnership is presented as a 
strategic one; it aims to combine Parthenon's extensive strategy capabilities across the 
Global 1000, private equity and education markets, with Ernst and Young’s global reach. 
What is important to note here is that this is a strategic investment by both parties to 
promote a new kind of imaginary; that investors can generate income through selling 
credit in the higher education sector, whilst students can seek credit to enable them to 
access higher education places, and an ensuing career.   
Three issues are to be noted here.  The first is that there is considerable work being done 
in these IFC-baked reports in ‘normalising’ the presence of private capital and new 
financial products in the HE sector. For example, in their introduction, the authors’ state:  
Whilst the report is supportive of private investment in education, it is also 
acutely aware of the risks involved when ‘private capital engages with public 
goods’ Among acknowledged risks is the danger that profits take precedence 
over societal impact and that private investment will exacerbate inequality 
(Assomull, Abdo, & Pelley, 2015: 3).  
This is a major issue of legitimacy – or trust and confidence - and one that will continue 
to challenge those actors actively promoting the making of higher education markets in 
that it makes it also vulnerable to political intervention and thus regulation of a kind that 
might be detrimental to rent seeking and profit-making.  Flagging awareness is an 
attempt to proactively manage the strength of an alternative imaginary that continues to 
shape the overall form and scope of higher education in many countries. Similarly, 
Laureate Education, until recently an entirely private equity-backed company,5  has 
rebranded itself a ‘public interest corporation’. Here we might read this ‘rebranding a 
response to the lack of trust that surrounds for-profits in the higher education sector and 
thus commitment to education as a public good versus a profitable good.  
The second is the claim that, despite the reservations noted above, that the presence of 
private capital in the higher education will be a ‘game changer’ (Assomull et al., 2015: 5). 
They argue that it is only private capital that can generate the level of innovation and 
expansion that will meet the needs and aspirations of the middle classes in the global 
south, with their aspirations for high quality education and a willingness to invest in 
education. There is little evidence to support this, and indeed much evidence - as we can 
see from our previous section on the for profit providers - that this is not the case. But 
this is not the major point. The main purpose here is to generate sufficient 
trustworthiness and confidence about the role of the private sector in creating innovative 
financial products that will in turn generate better learning, greater equity, and so on as 
the return on the investment.  
                                                          
5 In October 2015 it made an Initial Public Offer to shareholders  
The third is the substantive content of the reports; the range of highly creative and 
innovative start-ups and products they are now being promoting to service new 
emerging higher education markets and market actors – most prominently low-income 
students. These products include Social Impact Bonds, Development Impact Bonds, 
Asset-Backed Securities, Crowd Funding, Peer-to-Peer Loans, Human Capital Financing, 
amongst other products. We will elaborate briefly on two of these to highlight the 
emerging competition amongst investors, the ways in which these products are 
legitimated to generate trustworthiness and confidence, as well as how the nature of the 
credit relation between student and investor challenges and changes what it means to be 
a learner (i.e. human capital bonded into the future).  
Social Impact Bonds (pay for success bonds) were pioneered in the UK, Australia, India 
and the USA. The service provider enters into a contract with the public sector to 
administer projects that have a social outcome (inclusion of hard to reach populations in 
a foundation year leading to studies in a university). If the social impact has been met, the 
relevant government body pays the investors, along with a proportion of the realised 
savings (e.g. unemployment benefits).    
Human Capital Financing, or Income Sharing Agreements, mostly use web presence to 
bring an investor into a contractual relationship with a debtor/student. In this case, the 
investor lends the money to cover the costs of higher education with a view to taking a 
share of the debtor’s employment income over a fixed period into the future. Online 
intermediaries, like Lumni and Upstart, map the risk of the investment to the investor 
using statistical models that assess plans, country of residence, academic performance 
and the job market. These risks are then used to determine repayment requirements and 
loan amounts. Lumni has been a pioneer in this field, and has financed nearly 7,000 
students in Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and the United States, since its launch in 2001.  
The risk to the investor is what happens if the student does not pass, or does not secure 
well-paid future employment. For the moment we know very little about these products, 
and how they do and don’t work (and for whom).  What the ‘risk calculation’ tools suggest, 
however, is a class bias in that it is seeking to determine who is likely to do well at 
university and the proxy for this is family back-ground and the reputation of the 
university. Like with credit more generally, those with poorer credit records (or from 
asset poor homes) are likely to be charged higher rates of interest to manage the ‘risk’.   
These kinds of products  also points to the normalisation of indebtedness as part of the 
making and expansion of higher education markets, on the one hand, and the ways in 
which expectations around repaying might need to be generated also through global 
institutions in the face of more global working populations, on the other.     
 
Conclusion 
This paper set out to make a contribution to work on education markets, this time 
focusing attention on the growth of global non-state and multilateral actors in the higher 
education sector and the creation of ‘frontier markets’ in ‘the global south’. Our purpose 
was to shed light on processes involved in market-making, and to make visible newer 
actors in the sector whose activities and this interests often go un-noticed.  Our interest 
in the global south is a response to this special issue, and an opportunity to highlight the 
importance of developing a relational, spatial and social approach to higher education 
markets within and between the north and the south. It also draws attention to projects 
and processes that are exploitative of aspirations, given the structural changes in the 
global economy which Brown et al (2011: 148) describe as the ‘broken promise’ of the 
relationship between education, jobs and income 
Our cases reveal the global south is simultaneously viewed as a space and potential 
population for the north, using its comparative advantage to sell higher education as a 
commodity through innovative and creative approaches to recruitment, new modalities 
of provision (especially part-time/on-line) and financial arrangements. We also show it 
is important to view neither the north nor the south as ontologically flat in terms of power 
and social relations. The aspirations of learners we broadly referred to as the ‘global 
south in the north’ are now targeted as requiring ongoing development, or ‘servicing’, in 
terms of ‘higher education’. The aspiring north in the south, are also the object of highly 
creative approaches in the competition between institutions for stabilising the 
international student mobility pipeline, with agents developing and selling a range of 
products.  Beckert’s (2013) work has been particularly helpful to us in showing the 
fragility of higher education market-making in that they require ongoing work to ensure 
confidence and trust, whilst being faced with questions about whether or not higher 
education should be a commodity, that the poor should be the target of such a high level 
of indebtedness, that the north should be able to recruit from the global south, and so on.  
There are also considerable frictions confronting these projects, as not only must market-
making contend with existing imaginaries and practices regarding the ‘public good’ 
nature of higher education and how it should be invested in, but when ‘rogue traders’, 
‘failed markets’, increased indebtedness, and wealth inequalities, are made visible, this 
acts as a contrast to, and sheds light upon, these very different projects and their social 
relations for the north and the south.  
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